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French: Tort--Physician's Liability for Abandoning Patient

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
the WoRm~mEN's Co PF sArioN ACT. Concurring Opinion of
Maxwell, J., Caldwell v. State Compensation Commissioner, supra,
State v. District Court, 131 Minn. 352, 155 N. W. 103, an attitude which, it is believed, is not at variance with the legislative
intent, and will, on the whole, prove socially desirable.
-JOHN D. ALDEmSON.

TORT -

PHYSICIAN 'S LIABILITY FOR ABANDONING

PATIENT. -

A

physician undertook to care for a woman in childbirth, gave her
medicine to stimulate delivery, and left saying that he would be
'back in a couple of hours. He failed to return when medical aid
became necessary. The court held that he was liable in tort for
the suffering caused the patient before another doctor could be
procured and that it was no excuse that the physician was attending another woman in childbirth at the time and was unable
to leave. Young v. Jordan, 145 S. E. 41 (W. Va. 1928).
As a general proposition where a physician has undertaken to
care for a patient he becomes liable for the exercise of such skill
and diligence as that of an ordinary, reasonably prudent physician
in the same or similar circumstances. Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W.
Va. 168, 16 S. B. 564; Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va. 266, 53 S. .
147. 'Courts have uniformly held that the abandonment of a
patient, who is in need of medical attention, without excuse or
sufficient notice to enable him to procure another physician is
actionable negligence. Some courts, as in the West Virginia case,
therofore, have given damages in tort for malpractice upon such
abandonment. Barbour v. Martin, 62 Maine 536; Ritchey v. West,
23 Ill. 329; Gerken v. Plimpton, 70 N. Y. S. 793; Lawson v. Conaway, supra; Sinclair v. Brunson, 212 Mich. 387, 180 N. W. 358.
Other courts have held, where there was a contract of employment,
actual or implied, that the abandonment was a breach of contract
and have predicated liability upon that ground. Hood v. Moffett,
109 Miss. 757; 69 So. 664; Ballou v. Prescott, 64 Me. 305;
Lathrope v. Flood, 135 Cal. 458, 67 Pac. 683.
Where the action is in tort the duty of care presumably arises
from the fact that the physician has undertaken to care for the
patient; he may not, therefore, abandon the case midway in its
course. The situation is analagous to that in Black v. Railway
Company, 193 Mass. 448, where the conductor on a ttain helped
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a drunken man, who was unable to care for himself, off of the
car and part of the way up some steps. The man fell and injured himself, and the railway company was held liable, for, although no duty existed to aid the man, by undertaking to do so
the conductor became liable for the exercise of ordinary care; he
could not leave him in a more precarious position than he was in
before. The physician, likewise, by undertaking a case, makes
himself liable to attend the patient as long as his services are
needed, or the patient desires. Gerken v. Plimpton, supra; Lawson v. Conaway, supra.
The West Virginia court goes still further, however, and says
that the fact that the physician was with another patient and unable to leave was no excuse, citing Hood v. Moffett, supra; and
Sinclair v. Brunson, supra.
The former case was an action in contract, however, and appears to be an isolated case on the point. The court stated in
that case that "Where a physician agreed without qualification
to attend plaintiff-it was no excuse that at the time treatment
became necessary he was engaged with another patient and could
not leave, as the rule is: As a man consents to bind himself, so
shall he be bound." The liability imposed here was clearly for
breach of contract.
The situation is different, however, when the action is in tort.
A case might well arise in which the physician was in no way
negligent, and yet was forced to neglect one patient for another.
In such a case this rule would certainly operate unjustly upon
the physician and would be imposing liability without fault.
Sinclair v. Brunson, the other case cited by our court on this
point, was an action for malpractice, where, among other things,
it was charged that the physician failed to call to see the patient
as often as was necessary. The court said: "We think it is not
the law that doctors can take on so many patients that they will
be excused if they neglect some of them and harm results from
that neglect." The rule laid down here, however, seems to imply a prior negligence in the physician's taking on more patients than he could reasonably care for, and would not necessarily be in point in Young v. Jordan. The fact that two patients demand the physician's services at the same time does not
mean that he has been negligent in taking both cases originally.
The court in Young v. Jordan limits the rule, however, to the
facts in this case saying that "The fact that the defendant was
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called to attend another patient does not excuse him in this case."
Upon the actual facts here it would seem that the defendant was
negligent in failing to give the patient notice or in procuring another doctor for her as he might have done. The conclusion
reached here is no doubt correct and there is apparently no reason to fear that the court in another case would make an unwise
extension of the rule.
-HARRIET
L. FRENC.

,CRIMINAL LAW----GEN-ERAL INSTRUCTIONS NOT IN HARMONY WITH

GIVEN.-Accused was convicted of
first degree murder, and brought error. Defendant was a constable and had been threatened by deceased several days before
the tragedy, deceased telling defendant to get his gun and blackjack so he could "take them off of him." There was further evidence that defendant was disliked by deceased. A few days later
defendant was walking along the highway toward deceased's residence when deceased and a companion, both intoxicated and the
latter displaying a pistol, were going up the steps of deceased's
house. As defendant approached both men swore at him, and
defendant seeing another constable signaled to him to assist in
making an arrest, but it does not appear that the other heeded
the signal. Deceased then walked toward the defendant, his companion having retired in the house, saying "what in the hell
have you got to do with this?" at the same time having his
hand in his hip pocket or behind him. Defendant called twice
to halt, and fired a warning shot, and as this was without result,
fired the shot which took effect. It does not appear whether deceased was armed or not. The court charged the jury " * 0 If
the intent to kill is executed the instant it springs into the mind,
it is as truly murder as if it had dwelt there for a longer
period." Held, "i 0
Altho similar instructions have been approved by this court in particular eases, in view of the evidence
and circumstances surrounding the fatal shot, and the absence of
instructions dealing with murder in the first and second degrees
or manslaughter, *- " * the instruction 0 1 * was misleading * *
and therefore constitutes -reversible error", citing State v. Manns,
48 W. Va. 480, 37 S. E. 613; Cobb v. Simon, 119 Wis. 597, 97 N.
W. 276; State v. Shamblin, 143 S. E. 230 (W. Va. 1928).
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE
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